NEWS ABOUT MSHA

MSHA Proposes Rule to Reduce Miners' Exposure to Asbestos Released Friday, July 29, 2005

The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Admin-istration (MSHA) issued a proposed rule that would reduce by 20 times miners' permissible exposure limit (PEL) to asbestos. The rule would lower the current exposure limit for eight-hour work shifts from two fibers per cubic centimeter to 0.1 fibers per cubic centimeter. The proposed rule would affect miners at all metal and nonmetal mines, surface coal mines, and surface areas of underground coal mines in the United States .

Asbestos is the generic term for a group of minerals that occur naturally as long, thin fibers. Some adverse health effects associated with exposure to asbestos are lung diseases such as cancer (mesothelioma) and pulmonary fibrosis called asbestosis.

Under the proposal, the regulations would:

Written comments on this proposed rulemaking should be submitted within 60 days to the MSHA Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances, 1100 Wilson Blvd. , Room 2350, Arlington , Va. 22209-3939 ; fax 202-693-9441. Comments may be submitted at www.regulations.gov, or by e-mail to zzMSHA-comments@dol.gov, inserting RIN: 1219-AB24 in the subject line.

SURFACE ACCIDENT PREVENTION -- HOW RECENT SURFACE MNM ACCI-DENTS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED

In preparation for training during 2006, we examined fatal accident data covering a period from 2003 through July 2005. A brief summary of our findings follows:

Current Mine Fatalities

Surface MNM fatalities for 2003 and 2004 were about equal at 24. Data through July, 2005 indicate that fatalities will not decrease significantly during the current year.

Listing Fatal Accidents by Cause

We examined the causes of 61 fatal surface MNM accidents over the past 2 ½ years and listed each by a type representing a manageable control.

Table 1 lists the numbers of fatals by type for 2003, 2004 and through July of 2005. Six primary types are: 1) lockout, 2) cranes and rigging, 3) mobile equipment, 4) fall protection, 5) sliding product/earth, & 6) maintenance/ cleanup..

Conclusions - Accident Categories

Lockout (21)

A 7-step lockout procedure would have eliminated 21 or roughly 1/3^rd of the surface MNM fatalities during the period.  A 7-step lockout program includes:

1)      Prepare to shut down equipment

2)      Shut down equipment

3)      Isolate equipment from energy sources

4)      Apply locks

5)      Control stored energy

6)      Verify isolation from energy sources

7)      Prepare for startup (account for all tools and clear all personnel)

Lockout-related fatalities during the period were due to:

Failure to Shut Down Equipment – step 2 above (6 failures)

Failure to Isolate/Verify Isolation – steps 3 & 6 above (6 failures)

Failure to Control Stored Energy – step 5 above (8 failures)

Failure to prepare to restart equipment – remove tools – step 7 above (1 failure)

Every miner should consider each of these steps before performing maintenance  (unplug-ging, disassembly, cleanup, adjustments, repairs, etc.).

Cranes and rigging (13)

Rigger or Helper Position (8) -- Eight of 13 crane-related fatalities involved riggers or helpers standing in the wrong place when they or the operator made a mistake. Contributing factors included rigging failures where loads shifted or were dropped, running into energized overhead lines, mobile crane 2-block, a boat capsizing when assisting a crane to free a dredge anchor, and misunderstood hand signals between the operator and rigger.

Crane Operator Training - Tip-Over (3) -- Crane tip-over killed a rigger/helper who was hit by the swinging load. Crane tip-over also killed one operator when the cab was crushed by the impact. Failure to set the track brakes on a dragline resulted in an operator drowning when the dragline rolled into a water-filled excavation. All three of these can be attributed to inadequate task training and failure to stop, look, analyze and manage (SLAM) risks.

Man-Lift Operator Training and Risk Assessment (2) -- Two man-lift operators were killed. One was crushed against a steel structure when using the man-lift as a crane. The other was fatally burned when welding machines started a fire. Contributing factors were failure to pre-assess the fire hazard, failure to move the man-lift away before movement controls were damaged, and failure to safely escape from the damaged man-lift. Task training and risk assessment (SLAM risks) could have prevented this fatality.

Specific procedures that need to be considered in task training include the following. 1) Rigger/helpers must determine a safe location to stand to avoid being struck by the load if rigging fails, or the load shifts, 2) the crane operator must be task trained and required to follow safe procedures to avoid tipping over, including knowing how to determine load capacities under various conditions using a load chart and how to ensure that the crane is stable (outrigger pads on stable footing etc.), 3) both the rigger and operator must be aware of the need to take extra precautions when working around overhead power lines including maintaining safe distances or de-energizing the lines (lockout isolation and verification steps) where there is a danger of getting too close to them, as well as requiring the rigger/helper to remain out of electrical contact with the load by using insulated gloves, boots and tag lines if it is necessary to guide the load, 4) making sure the track brakes on a dragline are always locked when in use to avoid rolling into an excavation, 5) using a man-lift only as a man-lift, not as a crane, and being extra careful to ensure that there is no possibility for a fire to start when welding (or air gouging) from a man-lift, moving the man-lift away from the area immediately upon any indication of a fire, and having a safe procedure to escape when man-lift controls become disabled, 6) knowing how to inspect rigging to minimize the possibility of rigging failure and how to rig loads to minimize the potential for dropped loads, and 7) making sure the communication system used between the operator and rigger/helpers is clearly understood by all personnel.

Mobile equipment (12)

Traveling over edges (4) – In the four over-edge accidents, the operator got too close to an edge and either the edge caved (excavator, forklift), or the operator misjudged and drove over (dozer, scraper). Contributing factors include the scraper operator jumping out of the cab.  Methods for assessing the ground conditions when approaching excavations and guidelines for determining safe working distances from edges are needed to eliminate these fatal accidents.

Runaways (4) – These fatal accidents would have been prevented by: (1) controlling speed and downshifting at the proper speed and position at the tops of grades, (2) task training on the procedures used to avoid brake failure due to overuse on long grades, (3) taking steps to ensure that brakes are working properly, and (4) operator pulling pickup over when he feels he is about to black out. Contributing factors include not wearing a seatbelt and operators not knowing the steps to take in the event of a runaway.

Blind spots (3) – All of these accidents would have been prevented by pedestrians and pickup drivers following the rule of “never entering mobile equipment work areas without operator approval”.  Properly-working backup alarms and the use of horns accompanied by short delays prior to moving parked vehicles may also have prevented one or more of these fatalities.

Seatbelt (1) – Skidsteers tend to tip-over easily. Although skidsteers have a lap bar that provides some support and must be down to operate, a tip-over can still eject an operator who isn’t wearing a seatbelt as in this fatal accident. Operators must be taught how to avoid tip-overs and the importance of always wearing a seatbelt.

Fall Protection (7)

Fall Prevention Integrity (1) – One fatal accident involved a fall prevention chain falling off the hook when a miner leaned against it. Miners must not blindly rely on fall prevention chains, rails, etc., but should always inspect them to ensure they are functional.

Missing Barriers (1) -- Another fatality could have been prevented by a guard over a skylight located on a roof that a worker fell through. Failure to inspect the workplace prior to entering contributed to this fatal accident. Elevated surfaces, not designed as walkways, should be inspected and guards or barricades installed to ensure that workers will not fall through where there is insufficient strength to support them.

Failure to Use Fall Prevention/Arrest Systems (5) – The other 5 fatalities would have been prevented by the use of personal fall prevention or fall arrest systems, or having built-in fall-prevention systems in place.

Sliding Product/Earth (5)

Highwall  Failure – Slope/Height (1) -- One of these fatalities was a highwall failure where a loader was working at the toe of a highwall that was higher than the reach of the loader bucket and steeper than the angle of repose. Either a properly-benched highwall or a properly-sloped highwall would have prevented this accident.

Trench Support (2) – Two fatal accidents would have been prevented by supporting trench walls to keep them from caving before entry of personnel.

Entering Bins/Hoppers (2) – Two fatal accidents would have been prevented if workers hadn’t entered hoppers/bins to unplug them without a trained attendant and a properly-supported lifeline.

Maintenance/cleanup (3) (Table 3F)

Worker Position During Cleanup/Mainten-ance and Danger of Falling Materials (2) –These two fatal accidents would not have occurred if maintenance/cleanup workers had not been directly under areas where material could fall on them. One victim was hit by a rock which rolled off from an overhead conveyor as he hosed spillage from the concrete pad underneath. The other was hit by a chunk of material he hydro-blasted from a tank wall overhead.

Worker Position/Procedures -- The third would have been prevented by a worker standing back when using a hydraulic ram with a pipe extension when the pipe slipped out and struck the worker.

Other (2)

Entry into danger zone -- One fatal accident may have been prevented if a danger zone had been barricaded  and properly marked to prevent a worker from entering. The worker walked into a duct in a cement plant and received fatal burns after caving into hot cement dust. Workers must be informed that  cement dust piles retain internal heat for days and that hot dust looks the same as cold dust.

Blocked Fuel Hose Explosion – One fatal accident would have been prevented if a fuel oil truck driver had been warned that his hose was blocked when transferring fuel oil into a tank. The fuel oil, re-circulating through the pressure relief valve, became hot and this combined with pump pressure caused the hose to separate from a coupling, spraying the hot fuel oil onto the worker.

Non-fatal Accidents

Non-fatal accidents reported for the State of Michigan during 2003 and 2004 indicate that handling of materials continues to be the most frequent cause while slip or fall of person is second.  These data indicate that Michigan  mines could benefit from Powerlift or alternate back-injury-prevention training.

Slip, trip and fall prevention training should include: good housekeeping, proper access, correct use of ladders and fall prevention/ arrest systems.

Other major accident causes in Michigan included hand tools, machinery, and powered haulage.

These findings define our training needs for the upcoming year and we are currently in the process of building our program to address these needs.

MEETING ANNOUNCEMENTS

 National Instructors Conference Oct 11-13, 2005

This conference, held at MSHA’s Natiional Mine Academy in Beckley , West Virginia , consists of workshops and exhibits focused on training and training materials. For details and to register, call 304/256-3257.

Dave Carlson and/or Phil Eggerding will be making one of many presentations at this conference. The title will be Seven Equals Zero: Focusing on Seven Training Topics needed to eliminate Surface MNM Mining Fatalities.

Safety Lawyer Adele l. Abrams, Esq., CMSP to Speak at Holmes Meeting in Gaylord , MI Oct 14, 2005

NOTE – DATE CHANGED TO FRIDAY OCT. 14!!!

See the attached registration and agenda forms. Here is your opportunity to get free legal advise from the nation’s top safety lawyer on MSHA compliance, managing inspections and fignting citations. Adele will have 4-hours to make her presentation and answer your questions. The agenda for the day and a Registration form are attached.

The meeting will be held at Gaylord’s beautiful Otsego Club Resort. These workshops are designed to keep mine operators (managers, supervisors and trainers) up to date on MSHA-compliance issues. The $35 cost includes the lunch buffet. Take this opportunity to view beautiful fall colors at the peak of Michigan ’s fall color season and to golf at a premier course for a reduced rate. Rooms at the Otsego Club Resort are only $65 per night. Holding the meeting on a Friday gives you the opportunity to extend your stay in Gaylord, 60 miles south of the Mackinaw Bridge , over the weekend. Everyone is invited to attend.